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Abstract
A Joint Force Commander (JFC) leading military joint operations faces several complex challenges. The purpose
of this article is to investigate some of the challenges a Joint Force Commander may face when a conflict changes
character from being a high-intensity conflict to becoming a low-intensity conflict. Sources of evidence: In connection
with command and control, especially issues concerning different cultures and the understanding of this can be the
biggest challenge for a Joint Force Commander during the transition to a low intensity conflict as a peace support
operation setting. Main argument: Being able to anticipate some of these problems will be essential to a Joint Force
Commander's ability to exercise leadership and command and control. Conclusions: Furthermore, target selection
and information operations have proven to be two factors that will have a greater importance in the planning and
conduct of operations during a transition from a high-intensity conflict to a low-intensity conflict.
Keywords: Military leadership; Military; Joint operations; High-
intensity conflict; Low-intensity conflict; Command and control;
Target selection; Information operations
Introduction
A Joint Force Commander (JFC) leading a military joint operation
must face several and often highly complex challenges. The challenges
facing military leaders at various levels vary widely. Leadership at a
strategic level is not the same as leadership at a tactical level.
Leadership at a tactical level will often involve interpersonal relations
between a leader and a team member, as well as a direct form of
cooperation and communication. The style of leadership at the
strategic level will tend to be more indirect, relying on background
documents, frame allocations and representations [1]. A JFC faces
multi-faceted leadership challenges between the tactical and strategic
level. These challenges are not to be taken lightly.
When the conflict changes from being a high-intensity conflict to
becoming a low-intensity conflict, new challenges will arise. Many
different factors a JFC will have to consider will thus change character.
Low-intensity conflict is a comprehensive term covering for instance
peace support operations [2]. The term covers low-intensity conflicts
ranging from guerrilla warfare, terrorism, insurgency war, and
asymmetric warfare to operations that intend to address these forms of
warfare. One problem with recent low intensity conflicts is that there
are many actors involved in a theater of operations. Identifying the
different characteristics, capabilities, or localities from which a nation,
an alliance, a military force or other grouping derives its freedom of
action, physical strength, or will to fight will pose a great challenge for
military leaders [3].
In addition, as the "end-state" or final state might lie quite far into
the future. This may lead to the consequence that as time passes the
final state becomes difficult to deal with. It may also be difficult to
reach the end-state. By identifying the actors' objectives and the
desired end-state, a military leader (JFC) can define an end-state, that
is, what should be achieved when a joint operation has been
completed. In this way, the concept of end-state will be important in
order to obtain direction and focus in the planning and the actual
completion of an operation.
The overarching supporting documents describing the Norwegian
military's leadership is the Norwegian Armed Forces Chief of Defense’s
Policy on Leadership in the Armed Forces [1] and the Norwegian
Armed Forces Joint Operational Doctrine (NAFJOD) [2,4]. These
documents establish mission command (oppdragsbasert ledelse in
Norwegian) as the Norwegian Armed Forces basic leadership
philosophy. Mission command can be traced back to the end of the
19th century, with the Prussian concept of Auftragstaktik invented by
the Prussian general Von Moltke the elder [5].
There are a number of challenges that any JFC faces. This article will
be limited to discuss the North Atlantic Treaty organization (NATO)
forces during the transition from high-intensity conflict to a low-
intensity conflict in the context of a Crisis Response Operation with a
focus on Peace Support Operations. Furthermore, this type of
operation will be discussed on a general level. Specific examples of
operations will be provided. This is to further shed light on the theme
that is discussed in the present article. A further limitation in the
article is the use of NATO definitions, although some peace support
operations are carried out under the auspices of the UN. This is due to
the article´s focus on NATO publications.
This article will be limited to discussing the two most important
factors, that is, target selection and information operations. The reason
that these two factors to a greater extent than other factors are
important is that they change meaning when a conflict changes its
nature and the context of a low-intensity conflict with emphasis on
Peace Support Operations. The reason why they change their
importance is the increasing degree of complexity in a Peace Support
Operation means in relation to a high-intensity conflict.
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As an example of the massive impact information operations can
have in more modern conflict types, the conflict between the United
States and Vietnam will be mentioned in this article. It has been argued
that the United States lost this conflict because they failed to thwart
their opponents and their own the media's use of information. This
meant that they had to pull out of Vietnam [6]. Another example of the
same is the conflict between the Soviet Union and Afghanistan in the
years 1979-1989. Although the Soviet Union was militarily superior it
lost the conflict. The reason for this was that the Soviet Union failed to
transfer its power without having had to resort to full-scale war. Few
countries seem to be willing to commit to a full-scale war today. This
means that often militarily strong nations become handicapped when
it comes to affect the desired policy objectives. A more thoughtful use
of information operations could possibly make an important
contribution to achieve the desired objectives [7].
We will firstly define the key concepts appearing in this article.
Thereafter an explanation will be given of the JFCs challenges of
command and control during the transition from a high-intensity
conflict to a low-intensity conflict. Then two key factors of importance
for the planning and conduct of operations and how they change at the
transition from a high-intensity conflict to a low-intensity conflict will
be discussed. These two factors are respectively target selection and
information operations. However, exercising good and effective
military leadership is a very comprehensive subject and will not be
discussed in full in this article. Finally, we will present a short
conclusion of some of the challenges facing a JFC when the conflict




Leadership has probably been written about, formally researched,
and informally discussed more than any other single topic [8].
Leadership is also a subject that has long excited interest among people
[9]. Military leadership is about the leader's characteristics and
behavior, and the interaction between leaders and subordinates.
Besides this, a number of external factors exist. External factors are
system variables such as organizational structure, situation, context,
and coincidences, may affect the leadership [1]. This means that
leaders in cooperation with subordinates, in a targeted manner
structures, organizes, influences and legitimates the business. In our
case, the business is the joint operation.
Leadership is needed, as it is leadership that aims the gun so that the
team can pull the trigger [10]. Effective leadership is exercised in
cooperation with and in relation to others. Leadership can thus be
described as a result of the interaction between the leader and their
subordinates over time [2]. Leadership can further be understood as
the process that creates a common direction, alignment and
commitment in a military unit [1,11]. However, leadership is seen as a
being highly context dependent [12]. This means that a leader's
behavior and efficiency will be the result of interaction between
individual factors and the environment [13], where different situation
variables are crucial for what constitute an effective leadership [1].
Military leadership can thus be described as a continuous process that
is exercised in relation to others in a specific military context.
According to the Norwegian Armed Forces Joint Operational
Doctrine (NAFJOD) leadership is an activity where you in different
ways try to achieve goals through others. In a military sense, leadership
is formally based on the authority of command delegated to military
commanders for directing, coordinating and controlling military
operations [4]. We acknowledge that this is not an easy task to
perform. Especially in joint operations where all military services and
also other civilian actors are involved. In conducting joint operations,
the JFC will also spend much time on coordination and integration
with sibling headquarters and civilian leaders [14].
Command and control
Command and control (C2) is defined in The Norwegian Chief of
Defence’s Policy on Leadership in the Armed Forces as one of the basic
functions and the military term for the planning and management of
operations [1]. C2 consists of the organization, processes, procedures
and systems that make military commanders able to direct and control
the force. According to NAFJOD from 2014, the purpose of command
and control is twofold. Firstly, for facilitating the accomplishment of
operational goals in an effective and expedient way. Secondly, C2 shall
safeguard the society’s need for assigning authority and place
responsibility [14]. C2 is based on the leadership philosophy of mission
command.
The Norwegian Armed Forces Doctrine for Land Operations
(FDLO) with reference to the Land Forces Tactical Doctrine, also
known as ATP -35 (B) defines the term command as follows:
"command is the process by which the commander impresses his will
and intentions upon subordinates. It encompasses authority and
responsibility of deploying forces to fulfill his mission" [15]. Moreover,
with the same reference to ATP -35 (B), the concept of control is
defined in the FDLO as follows: "control is the process which the
commander, assisted by his staff, directs and coordinates the activities
of the forces allocated" [15].
Joint force commander and high-and low-intensity conflicts
A JFC has the authority to exercise command or operational control
over a joint force [2,16]. High-intensity conflicts can be defined as
conflicts in which states' existence is at stake, and in which the whole
society will be organized against the war. Low-intensity conflicts are
defined as political- military battles with the intent to win political,
military, social, economic, or psychological objectives [2]. Traditional
use of military up to the level below using regular forces is a common
characteristic in a low-intensity conflict [17].
Crisis response operations and peace support operations
Crisis Response Operations is defined in the Allied Joint Publication
3.4.1 [18] as NATO activities that fall outside the objectives of Article 5
operations that deal with collective defense. Crisis Response
Operations is part of the term "Non - Article 5 Crisis Response
Operations" (NA5CRO) [19]. Operations that supports peace is
adopted in MC 327/2 (the NATO Military Policy for Non - Article 5
Crisis Response Operations) as an aspect of NA5CRO [19], and is
normally known as Peace Support Operations [18]. Peace Support
Operations can be divided into several types of operations:
Peacekeeping, peace enforcement, conflict prevention, peacemaking,
peace building and humanitarian operations [18]. Another definition
of Peace Support Operations (PSO) is found in the Allied Joint
Publication 3.4.1 [18]. Peace Support Operations is here defined as
"multi-functional operations, conducted impartially, normally in
support of an internationally recognised organisation such as the UN
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or Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE),
involving military forces and diplomatic and humanitarian agencies.
PSOs are designed to achieve a long-term political settlement or other
specified conditions. PSOs include peacekeeping and peace
enforcement, as well as conflict prevention, peacemaking, peace
building and humanitarian relief " [18].
Peace support operations are defined as those operations which will
assist in managing crises and armed conflicts, and that is authorized by
the United Nations (UN) Charter Chapter VI or VII. The concept of
peace support operations is also used to describe a category of the
military’s international operations. In these operations, the main
purpose is to stabilize the situation between two or more parties, and
the overall level of conflict is lower than fighting against irregular and
regular forces. It should be said that both types of conflict can occur
within a peace support operation. UN and NATO operate with the
following categorization of peace support operations: preventive
diplomacy, peacekeeping, peace building, peacemaking and peace
enforcement [2].
Command and control challenges in the transition from a
high-intensity conflict to a low-intensity conflict
The Allied Joint Publication 01 describes that all operations
generally have the same approach [20]. This is due to the fact that
NATO should be able to handle a full spectrum of operations from
total war to humanitarian operations. In a Peace Support Operation
setting the operational intensity, political constraints, ROE, mandate,
and the number of participants will vary and this will provide more
challenges for the JFC. ROE is an abbreviation and stands for "rules of
engagement" and serves as a guideline for how things should be
handled by the military force. An important factor for the JFC is to
take into account the factors that may hinder the success in a Peace
Support Operation setting [18]. The challenges that are added to the
JFC in the transition to a low-intensity conflict in the context of a
Peace Support Operation setting will partly be attributed to lack of
support from the international community, and perhaps the lack of
support from the local population in the operational area.
In addition, the lack of support from the leaders of the actors
involved in the conflict could pose a major challenge. Further
challenges to the JFC may be tensions between pure combat operations
and the operations performed in a Peace Support Operation setting.
Krulak [21] introduced the term "three block war" in the late 1990s.
Three block war describes the need for the flexibility of military forces.
This is true in an operation, and not only between different operations.
The three-block war means that within three blocks one might find
oneself simultaneously involved in both war full-scale stabilization
operations, and humanitarian assistance. In this case, it is essential that
the JFC exercises good end effective military leadership.
Challenges regarding cultural aspects in the transition from
a high-intensity conflict to a low-intensity conflict
A JFC will also have to consider cultural aspects, i.e. the cultural
environment that characterizes both the conflict zone, but also cultural
differences between the participating nation’s forces. In 2006, NATO
consisted of 26 different member countries [22]. Recently, Montenegro
was the last country to join the NATO, summing up the member states
of NATO to a total of 29 countries [23]. These 29 countries are
probably very different in terms of culture and attitudes. Van Creveld
[24] argues that the hardest thing for a force commander is dealing
with people involved in the conflict, both internal forces and other
actors. This is because with an increased focus on people and not on
military standard techniques the level of uncertainty will increase in a
Peace Support Operation setting. This view is supported by von Porat
Erichsen and Kvarving [25] in their book on military operations. They
point out that different cultures can create a lot of challenges related to
the conduct of military operations. The JFCs ability to exercise good
and effective military leadership based upon a solid understanding of
different cultures thus becomes an important factor for success.
In addition, the complexity of a Peace Support Operation is much
more complex than in a high-intensity conflict under Article 5, and the
participating nations tend to have national caveats, i.e. limitations on
what each nation can do in order to accomplish the mission [18]. To be
able to ensure that the peace support force will act impartially and
neutrally may also become a major challenge for the JFC in a PSO
setting. It has been shown that even if a Peace Support Operation force
perceive themselves as both neutral and impartial, it is far from certain
that other involved actors and parties perceive the force in the same
way [26].
A related problem is that it may be necessary to have very robust
mandates and limited ROEs in a Peace Support Operation setting.
ROEs restrict how an operation can be performed. An example of this
is the conflict in Rwanda in 1994 where the French General and the
force commander Romeo Dallaire [27] reported being completely
paralyzed while genocide was committed. This was due to the unclear
mandate and limitation in the ROE. This can lead to a growing
dissatisfaction among the force, and thus represents a further
command and control challenge for the JFC. An important challenge
for the JFC will be to understand the overall political- strategic
objectives and then to translate this into a low-intensity conflict with a
high degree of complexity [28].
Target selection
Identifying the different elements that need attention is a challenge
for a JFC. These elements may be referred to as targets, and the content
of a target may vary. A target is defined in the Allied Joint Publication
3.9 on page 1.1 as” a selected geographic area, object, capability,
person, or organization (including their will, understanding, and
behaviour); which can be influenced as part of the military
contribution to a political end-state. A target is normally not critical in
and of itself but rather its importance is derived from its potential
contribution to achieving the commander’s military objective(s)” [29].
Joint targeting is defined as the process of determining the effects
necessary to achieve the commander’s objectives [29]. The process of
target selection is to be understood here as the same as the term
targeting. Targeting plays a major role in the planning and conduct of
operations. It looks like the targeting process will become increasingly
more effect-based in low intensity conflicts [18].
It has been shown that it is of great importance how to win over an
opponent. Kagan [30] argues that the true center of gravity in a conflict
with a regime change is not to destroy the old system, but to create a
new system. This means that one must think about the long-term
consequences of the target selection has been made. A regime change
after a high-intensity should be viewed in the context of nation-
building and peace support. The conflict in Afghanistan is an example
of a low-intensity conflicts that shed light on this issue. Is it appropriate
through targeting to aid in the destruction of much of the
infrastructure of an area if one knows that one will be there for a long
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time? Certain goals have proven to be so politically sensitive that you
cannot take them out or destroy them [30]. Past wars have usually been
characterized as asymmetric wars where war between the actors has
been recorded using different objectives, means and methods [31].
Today's low intensity conflicts are to a greater degree characterized by
disorganization, and more different actors are involved with various
strategic, political, religious and other objectives [2]. Actors are defined
as adversaries, and they can both regular and irregular forces, or
terrorists and criminal groups [4]. In a low-intensity conflict it is likely
that the threshold for what are acceptable targets will decrease [32].
Lessons from recent international conflicts clearly show that the
unnecessary loss of civilian and military is accepted to a lesser extent
than before.
In addition, it will in a Peace Support Operation be less acceptance
of so-called "lethal targeting", and the focus will probably change to
"non - lethal targeting". On the other hand in a low-intensity conflict,
one has a possibility to use a greater degree of such non-lethal weapons
in the targeting process. An earlier example of the use of non -lethal
weapons is the use of carbon fiber ammunition to take out power
installations in Iraq and Serbia [32].
The aim of a Peace Support Operation can be to secure or to
implement a peace agreement. Information Operations and
Psychological Operations will usually dominate the target selection
process during this period. Regarding the target selection screening
process it will often be limited in a Peace Support Operation. In
addition, the own forces take much greater account of other actors and
civilians in the area. This also concerns how one’s own force is
perceived by others in the conflict area. When it comes to the target
selection and acceptance process it will be characterized by being
longer and also by being more complicated in a low-intensity conflict
compared with a high-intensity conflict [33]. This is because the
various nations' political decision making can take time. One should
also be aware of that in a low-intensity conflict time will often be less
critical than in a high-intensity conflict. The choice of effectors, i.e.
who will carry out what and how, will be much greater in a peace
support operation. This will demand more creativity with regard to the
choice of means to achieve a desired effect. To make an assessment of
the efforts that have been made ​illloften  be very difficult. This is
because many of the targets will require continuous exposure over a
long period, and any effects may be difficult to judge.
Information operations
Information Operations are operations that will support the
ongoing operation. Information operations are defined in the Allied
Joint Publication 3.10 in page 1-3 as "coordinated actions to create
desired effects on the will, understanding and capability of adversaries,
potential adversaries and other approved parties in support of Alliance
overall objectives by affecting their information, information-based
processes and systems while exploiting and protecting one’s own" [34].
Information Operations consists of several different disciplines or
fields. Key elements of information operations are information
security, psychological operations (PSYOPS), deception, electronic
warfare, computer network operations and physical destruction of
information infrastructure [2]. However, it should be mentioned that
during Operation Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan the distribution
of PSYOPS products did not have any some significant progress due to
the fact that the majority of the citizens of Afghanistan are illiterate [7].
The increased importance of Information Operations in a low-
intensity conflict must be viewed in relation to the changed global
security situation, focusing on complex interactions between state and
non - state actors.
An example of a conflict in which Information Operations has
become increasingly important is the ongoing conflict in Afghanistan
[7]. One achievement of NATO's final state in Afghanistan for example
might not be so dependent on the fact that the founder and leader of
al-Queda Osama Bin Laden was killed. A critical aspect will be the
extent to which NATO is able to hold together until the end-state of
NATO in Afghanistan is obtained. Here, Information Operations could
be a significant contribution to creating cohesion both within the
coalition and externally to populations in NATO member countries
and to the rest of the world. It is important that one takes into account
that this type of problem can occur when planning the operation. One
can thus avoid the well-known problem that occurred during the
Vietnam War where the Americans were finally forced to withdraw
from Vietnam. A familiar example of misuse of information during the
Vietnam War was the Americans’ use of so-called "body count" to
demonstrate success in operations. This proved to create a strong
dissatisfaction at home in the United States. According to Summers
[6], the body count phenomenon rested upon counting the number of
dead Vietnamese. This was used as a measure of how effective the
operations had been. To complicate the picture further then it is likely
that future operations in ongoing low-intensity conflicts do not only
occur in the operational area. Future operations will be characterized
by transnational actors and the fronts will be in many places at once,
both within the operational area and at home in one’s own country.
Information activities will in such operations be very vulnerable
because of the media's role in Peace Support Operations. This means
that attention in terms of being culturally sensitive is likely to have a
major impact on achieving success in future peace support operations
[35].
Conclusion
For a JFC in a joint operation that changes character from being a
high-intensity conflict to becoming a low-intensity conflict, there are
many challenges. Obviously, this also concerns good end effective
leadership. In connection with command and control, especially issues
concerning different cultures and the understanding of this can be the
most important challenge for a JFC during the transition to a Peace
Support Operation setting. Being able to anticipate some of these
problems will be essential to a JFC's ability to exercise command and
control.
Furthermore, target selection and information operations have
proven to be two factors that will have a greater importance in the
planning and conduct of operations during a transition from a high-
intensity conflict to a low-intensity conflict. Finally, the overall
complex leadership challenges are not to be taken lightly. These include
building and maintaining trust among staff officers, between
organizational levels and the many different bodies that are involved in
joint military operations.
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